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Proposed Economic Partnership
Agreements (EPAs) between the
European Union and African, Caribbean
and Pacific (ACP) countries constitute a
major threat to poverty reduction and
development. They will:
n construct new and unfair trade rules by creating free
trade areas between the EU and regional groupings
of ACP countries
n reduce the policy space that ACP countries need to
develop their economies and eradicate poverty 
n lead to significant losses in ACP fiscal revenues
n lead to de-industrialisation in ACP countries
n undermine African regional integration 
n grant European corporations greater rights over
African economies.
This report challenges the European Commission’s
argument that free trade EPAs are the only way to meet
WTO requirements and to integrate African countries
into the global economy. Developing countries have a
right to special and differential treatment under WTO
rules: any new trade agreement between the EU and
ACP countries must preserve and expand this right.
New research by ActionAid in Ghana and Kenya refutes
the European Commission’s argument that EPAs would
aid poverty reduction and promote sustainable
development. On the contrary, reciprocal trade
liberalisation under EPAs would lead to a decline in
manufacturing and agro-industrial development. Agro-
processing industries, such as the Ghanaian tomato
and Kenyan sugar industries are particularly vulnerable.
Eliminating tariffs would create significant revenue
losses for a typical sub-Saharan African government
leading to either severe cutbacks in public services or
increased taxes on poor people.
The EU is using the EPA negotiations to push through
agreements on investment, government procurement
and competition policy that developing countries
rejected at WTO negotiations in 2003. These
agreements would reduce the policy space available to
African governments. 
EPAs threaten regional integration, a central plank of
African development strategy since political
independence. This strategy has sought to ameliorate
the economic problems created by the colonial
fragmentation of Africa into many nation states with little
economic coherence. The EPAs configuration process
has created new regional groupings that are
inconsistent with, and undermine, existing African
economic and political blocs. Reducing regional
integration to trade liberalisation undermines the
broader socio-economic and political objectives of
existing bodies.
ACP concerns have been marginalised while the
European Commission has employed divide-and-rule
tactics in the EPA negotiations. The European
Commission ignored ACP concerns during the first
phase of the negotiations and continues to meddle in
internal ACP negotiation processes under the guise of
capacity building.
There are viable alternatives to EPAs, such as extending
the Everything But Arms scheme to all ACP countries or
revising WTO rules to allow for truly pro-poor and pro-
development EPAs.
ActionAid calls on British and European governments 
to change the European Commission’s EPA negotiating
mandate, and withdraw demands for reciprocal trade
liberalisation and agreements on the ‘Singapore issues’.
Both EU and ACP countries must push for the reform of
WTO rules to allow for pro-poor and pro-development
trade agreements between developing and developed
countries. The European Commission must begin an





Three decades after the first Lomé convention set the
trading relationship between the European Union and
African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) countries, new
economic partnership agreements (EPAs) are being
negotiated that constitute a major threat to poverty
reduction efforts and the development prospects of
some of the world’s poorest countries.
New research by ActionAid in Ghana and Kenya shows
that the proposed EPAs would harm African
industrialisation efforts by forcing fledging industries to
compete with established European corporations. Lost
revenues from indiscriminate and premature trade
liberalisation would create a strain on government
finances and public services. EPA investment
agreements would restrict the ability of African
governments to pursue nationally prioritised economic
and social objectives. 
Trade with the EU is very important for Africa. The EU 
is a far more important market for Africa than the US
or Japan.1 For historical reasons, the EU is sub-Saharan
Africa’s single largest trading partner, receiving about
31% of Africa’s exports and supplying 40% of its
imports.2
Between 1975 and 2000, trade between the EU and
ACP countries was governed by the Lomé conventions,3
which granted ACP countries better access to the EU
market than other developing countries.4 The
preferences granted to ACP countries under these
conventions were non-reciprocal: ACP countries did not
have to extend similar or other preferences to the EU in
return. This was based on the recognition that, because
of the vast differences in economic development
between the EU and ACP countries, any fair trade
arrangement between them had to treat ACP countries
differently. With the expiry of the Lomé preferences, the
EU and ACP countries signed a cooperation accord
known as the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) in
2000, which provides for the negotiations and
establishment of new trade agreements between the
EU and regional ACP groupings by 1st January 2008.
EPA negotiations are one set of a series of bilateral
negotiations taking place in parallel to the multilateral
WTO talks.5 The growing influence of developing
countries at the WTO, particularly of larger countries
such as China, India and Brazil, has made it more
difficult for the EU and US to dictate terms to the rest
of the world.6 As a result both economic superpowers
have increasingly focused on bilateral and regional
trade negotiations in order to secure new markets for
their goods and services and obtain concessions from
poor countries that would be difficult to achieve at
the WTO.
EPAs are premised on the assumption that
indiscriminate trade liberalisation and market
deregulation are best for achieving development. This
model of development was forced upon many
developing countries in the 1980s and 1990s through
policy conditions imposed by the World Bank and the
IMF, with disastrous consequences.7 Under this model,
the number of people living below the poverty line
continued to rise rather than decline, with 1.2 billion
people in the developing world living on less than
US$1 a day by 2000. In Africa, the number increased
from 217 million in 1987 to 291 million (46% of the total
population) in 2000.8
1 Stevens, C. and Kennan, J. (2004) ‘Comparative Study of Preferential Access Schemes for Africa’, Report on a DFID-commissioned study, IDS: April 2004, p.17.
2 Hinkle, L. and Schiff, M. (2004) ‘Economic Partnership Agreements between Sub-Saharan Africa and the EU: a development perspective’, World Economy, Vol.27, Issue 9.
3 They remain in place under a WTO waiver until December 2007 when they must either be replaced by another trade agreement or be extended through another WTO waiver.
4 Guaranteed quotas and prices and/or duty free market access, in certain agricultural products, especially sugar, beef and bananas.
5 There are 6 EPA regions in total: 4 for Africa, 1 for the Caribbean, 1 for the Pacific.
6 Although rich countries still do their best to get their way by using dirty tricks and underhand tactics. See ActionAid (2004) ‘Divide and Rule: the EU and US response to developing country
alliances at the WTO’.
7 On the failure of the ‘Washington Consensus’ see, Kohsaka, A. (2004) New development strategies: Beyond the Washington Consensus, Palgrave, Macmillan; Stewart, F. et al (1987)
Adjustment With a Human Face, UNICEF, New York; UNCTAD (2002) Economic Development in Africa, UNCTAD, Geneva.
6 World Bank (2001) Attacking Poverty, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
1. Introduction
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In a series of studies, Harvard University economist,
Dani Rodrik, has shown that there is little evidence that
trade liberalisation is correlated with economic growth.
He has shown that whilst no country has developed
successfully by turning its back on international trade,
none has developed by simply liberalising its trade
either. The critical balance lies in each country adopting
its own trade and investment policies and strategies, in
line with its development needs.9
A growing body of evidence supports Rodrik’s work. For
instance, the Africa Economic Report 2004 concludes
that trade liberalisation alone will not boost growth and
poverty reduction in Africa.10 Instead, the report argues
that the successful integration of Africa into the world
economy will require better-educated and healthier
workforces, improved economic and political
governance, better quality infrastructure, and dynamic
trade policies, including gradual and targeted trade
liberalisation. A recent report by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)
draws a similar conclusion.11
Trade liberalisation plus enhanced market access does
not necessarily equal poverty reduction: most poor
countries undertook extensive trade liberalisation in the
1990s, and also received some degree of preferential
market access from developed countries, but
performed dismally in reducing poverty. UNCTAD warns
that if past trends continue, the poorest countries in the
world will continue to lag behind the rest in 2015, the
year by which the international community hopes to
halve the proportion of the global population living in
extreme poverty.
Evidence from successful developers including the US,
UK, other European countries and the ‘Asian tigers’
shows that protecting infant industries was an important
part of early trade and industrial policy.12 Careful use of
protection together with other policies to encourage
backward and forward linkages, learning and adoption
of technology will be needed by African countries to
overcome the many market failures that exist in their
economies. Successful developed countries did not
accept the economists’ notion of fixed comparative
advantage in producing and exporting particular goods;
rather, they developed comparative advantage as they
went along. For example, Taiwan was transformed from
a tiny Japanese colony in the 1940s to a global leader
in steel and micro-processors in a single generation.
Successful development needs a dynamic, long-term
policy approach, which Africa will lose if it locks itself
into free trade with Europe. 
ActionAid believes that trade and markets can be
important instruments for achieving economic
development and poverty reduction. But they must be
managed fairly to enhance opportunities for the poor
and to protect the vulnerable. ActionAid calls for the
demands for full reciprocal trade liberalisation and
negotiations on investment, competition policy and
public procurement to be dropped from the EPA
negotiations. Alternatives to EPAs must be sought. 
9  See Rodriquez, F. and Rodrik, D. (1999) ‘Trade Policy and Economic Growth: A Sceptic’s Guide to the Cross-Country Evidence’, Centre for Economic Policy Research, Discussion Paper
Series 2143; Rodrik, D. (2001) ‘The Global Governance of Trade As If Development Really Mattered’, UNDP; Rodrik, D. (2002) ‘Trade Rout: Reform in Argentina, Take Two’, New Republic, 14th
January 2002.
10 UNECA (2004) Africa Economic Report 2004, UNECA, New York.
11 UNCTAD (2004) The Least Developed Countries Report, UNCTAD, Geneva.
12 Chang, H-J. (1993) ‘The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol.16, No.2; Amsden, A. (1989) Asia’s Next Giant, OUP, Oxford.
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The European Commission advances two main
arguments in support of its demand for the creation of
free trade agreements (FTAs) between itself and
regional groupings of ACP countries. The first is legal –
that this is the only arrangement acceptable to the
WTO. The second is economic – that such FTAs will
stimulate economic development in ACP countries.13
We deal with each of these in turn.
WTO compatibility: 
the European Commission’s legal argument
The Cotonou Partnership Agreement (CPA) that
provides for EPA negotiations explicitly links them to the
WTO, stating that:
The Parties agree to conclude new WTO-compatible
trading arrangements.14
In the early 1990s, the non-reciprocal trade preferences
under Lomé governing trade relations between the EU
and ACP countries were increasingly challenged: they
were seen to discriminate against other developing
countries and were therefore deemed incompatible with
certain WTO rules. There was also concern that the
trade preferences had failed to integrate many ACP
countries into the global economy and were less likely
to do so because of increasing preference erosion (a
decline in the value of the Lomé preferences as a result
of multilateral trade liberalisation).15 This was the context
under which EPAs were proposed.
EPAs fall under the WTO rules on regional trade
agreements (RTAs). The most important of these is
Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) 1994, a founding document of the WTO,
which states that:
5. (c) any interim agreement shall include a plan and
schedule for the formation of such a customs union
or of such a free-trade area within a reasonable
length of time 16
The WTO’s understanding of a “reasonable length of
time” is that:
The "reasonable length of time" referred to in
paragraph 5(c) of Article XXIV should exceed 10
years only in exceptional cases. In cases where
Members parties to an interim agreement believe
that 10 years would be insufficient they shall provide
a full explanation to the Council for Trade 
in Goods of the need for a longer period.17
Article XXIV goes on to say that:
8. (b) A free-trade area shall be understood to mean 
a group of two or more customs territories in which
the duties and other restrictive regulations of
commerce (except, where necessary, those
permitted under Articles XI, XII, XIII, XIV, XV and XX)
are eliminated on substantially all the trade between
the constituent territories in products originating in
such territories… 18
The European Commission interprets the above clauses
to mean that 90% of the trade in goods between the
two parties must be liberalised over a period of 10-12
years19 an interpretation first used during the EU-South
African trade negotiations in 1999.
There are a number of problems with the EU’s
conception of reciprocity in EPAs. Firstly, the principle of
reciprocity as intended in the GATT/WTO does not
necessarily carry over to North-South trade agreements,
since small countries have not been required to offer
13 Lamy, P. (2004) Opening of the negotiations for the Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) between the Caribbean Forum of ACP States (CARIFORUM) and the European Union, Statement
by Pascal Lamy, Kingston, Jamaica, 16th April 2004, http://europa.eu.int/comm/commissioners/lamy/speeches_articles/spla220_en.htm
14 Article 36.1 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000).
15 Mbuende, K. and Davies, R. (2002) ‘Beyond the Rhetoric of Economic Partnership Agreements’, www.weedbonn.org/eu/texte/Booklet-Cape-Town-JPA.doc
16 WTO (1994) ‘General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Article XXIV’: http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regatt_e.htm#gatt
17 WTO (1994) ‘Understanding on the Interpretation of Article XXIV of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regatt_e.htm#gatt  
18 WTO (1994) ‘General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade: Article XXIV’, http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/region_e/regatt_e.htm#gatt
19 European Commission (undated) interpretation of Article XXIV, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mercosur/bacground_doc/template_paper5.htm; also based on EU-South Africa
Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement liberalisation timescale.
2. EPAs: the European Commission’s
main arguments
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reciprocal concessions to industrial countries in
multilateral negotiations.20 The 1979 Enabling Clause
calls upon industrialised countries not to seek reciprocal
concessions inconsistent with the development,
financial and trade needs of individual developing
countries. Secondly, reciprocity between developing
and developed countries can be very damaging to the
former because the asymmetries in economic size
mean that developing countries have to make relatively
larger concessions and bear disproportionately high
costs of adjustment than the developed countries.
Premature trade liberalisation can also contribute to de-
industrialisation in developing countries, characterised
by a decline in manufacturing, the collapse of
industries, and a loss of jobs and ‘tacit knowledge’.21
For African counties to liberalise 90% of all trade with
the EU within a 10-12 year period would require them to
open all but 10% of their markets to EU products within
a decade, regardless of the structural weaknesses or
the macro-economic conditions of their economies.
‘Asymmetrical liberalisation’ is not the solution
The proposition that the gap in development between
EU and ACP countries can be addressed through
‘asymmetrical reciprocity or liberalisation’ is not
convincing.
Although this differential approach, based on the trade
agreement between the EU and South Africa22, gives
ACP countries the opportunity to make slightly less
drastic (under 90%) cuts in tariffs over a slightly longer
time period, the extent to which developing countries
liberalise their trade should be based on their individual
development and economic needs, and not determined
by arbitrary timeframes and product coverage. 
Asymmetrical or not, reciprocity would ‘lock in’ African
countries to only one path to development – that of a
liberalisation or free trade model. More importantly,
basing African country trade liberalisation commitments
on arbitrary timeframes presupposes that development
is a linear process, which is often not the case. What is
the use of giving a country a longer transition period,
when they may be worse off economically in 15 years’
time than they are now?
Special and differential treatment for developing
countries
The European Commission’s claim that EPAs must be
free trade areas in order to conform to WTO rules is
self-serving and misleading. The WTO recognises that
developing and developed countries are different, and
reflects this in its rules on special and differential
treatment (SDT). For example, the General Agreement
on Trade in Services (GATS) makes special provision for
developing countries in relation to regional agreements
on services.23 SDT is also explicitly part of the Cotonou
Partnership Agreement, which states that:
Economic and trade co-operation shall take account 
of the different needs and levels of development of
the ACP countries and regions. In this context, the
Parties reaffirm their attachment to ensuring special
and differential treatment for all ACP countries.24
WTO compatibility is a moving target
Furthermore, an examination of all SDT-related
provisions is part of the ongoing WTO Doha round
negotiations,25 effectively making WTO compatibility a
moving target. In fact, ACP countries tabled a proposal
at the WTO in April 2004 seeking more flexibility with
regard to the interpretation of reciprocity in FTAs
between developed and developing countries: 
20 Freund, C. (2002) ‘Reciprocity in Free Trade Agreements’,  World Bank; Staiger, R. ‘Tariff Phase-Outs: Theory and Evidence from GATT and NAFTA: Comment’ in Frankel, J (ed) (1998)The
Regionalization of World Economy, University of Chicago Press, Chicago; Yanai, A. (2001)  ‘Reciprocity in Trade Liberalisation’, APEC Study Center, Working Paper Series 00/01 – No 2.
21 See for instance, Freund, C. (2002); Hinkle, L. and Schiff, M. (2004); Frankel, J. (1998); World Bank (2004) Global Economic Prospects 2005, World Bank, Washington D.C; Yanai, A. (2001).
22 Under which South Africa was to liberalise about 86% of its trade with the EU, and the EU was to liberalise about 94% with South Africa (90% unweighted average of the two sides’ trade).
23 Article V, paragraph 3.a of WTO (1994) General Agreement on Trade in Services.
24 Article 35.3 of the Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000)
25 WTO (2001) ‘Doha Ministerial Declaration’’, Paragraph 44.
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With regard to duties, appropriate flexibility shall be
provided for developing countries in meeting the
“substantially all the trade” requirement in respect of
trade and product coverage, including in terms of
the application of favourable methodology and/or
lower threshold levels, if to be applied, in the
measurement of trade and product coverage of
developing country parties to an RTA [regional trade
agreement].
The maximum length of the transition period
permissible is to be established, the period should
be determined in such a manner that is consistent
with the trade, development and financial situation
of developing countries, but in any case not less
than 18 years.26
This matter is of interest to many developing countries
in the light of the proliferation of FTAs between
developed and developing countries.27 However, the EU
continues to show little interest in changing WTO rules
on regional trade agreements, insisting  that the current
WTO rules offer enough ‘flexibility’ to enable the
creation of development-friendly trade agreements
between developed and developing countries. 
Whatever happened to the ‘round for free’?
In May 2004 the EU proposed a special deal for the
world’s poorest countries at the WTO. Known as a
‘round for free’, the offer was that the G-90 group of
least developed countries and ACP states,
would not be called upon to further open their
markets while they would benefit from improved
access to developed and rich developing markets
for their agricultural and industrial products.28
Although this was a political tactic employed by the EU
to divide developing countries at the WTO (by creating
a wedge between the G-90 and the G-20), taken at
face value, the EU appeared to accept the development
case for non-reciprocal trade liberalisation at the WTO.
Yet in parallel EPA negotiations, the EU insists that
reciprocity is good for ACP countries. The contradiction
is glaring.
2. EPAs: the European Commission’s main arguments
26  WTO (2004) ‘ACP Submission on Regional Trade Agreements’, 28th April 2004, pp.3-4.
27  For instance, CAFTA (the Central America Free Trade Agreement) which brings together the US and El Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua, Guatemala, and later Costa Rica and the FTAA (the Free
Trade Area of the Americas) which brings together the US and 34 other countries in the Americas8
28  European Commission (2004) ‘WTO-DDA – EU ready to go extra mile in three key areas of the talks’, 10th May 2004, http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/lt/article_3490_lt.htm
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The effect of trade liberalisation on poverty reduction
depends on: 
n how much poor people produce exported goods and
consume imports
n the degree of labour mobility
n the state of domestic industries
n the state of income distribution.29
Depending on these factors, trade liberalisation can
create winners and losers, aggravating or reducing
gender, income or regional disparities. A successful or
pro-poor trade liberalisation strategy is one that ensures
that the winners’ gains outweigh the losers’ losses (i.e.
the winners can compensate the losers). 
The experience of the East Asian ‘tigers’ demonstrates
that successful trade policies must be aligned with,
rather than pursued in isolation from, development
strategies.30 For instance, trade liberalisation might be
accompanied by complementary measures, such as
infrastructure development, skills formation, asset
redistribution, interventions in basic services such as
health and the extension of credit facilities.  
There is little evidence that trade liberalisation under
EPAs would be aligned with Africa’s development
needs. On the contrary, it would follow the
indiscriminate approach employed during structural
adjustment programmes (SAPs) – opening markets
without considering the development needs of
individual countries.
That approach to trade liberalisation in Africa through
SAPs had negative consequences, as detailed below: 31
n Côte d’Ivoire’s chemical, textile, footwear and
automobile assembly industries collapsed after tariffs
were cut 40% in 1986, leading to massive job losses
and negative multiplier effects throughout the
economy.
n A trade liberalisation programme that reduced the
effective rate of protection from 165% in 1985 to
90% in 1988 had eliminated one third of
manufacturing jobs in Senegal by 1990.
n In Ghana, liberalisation of consumer imports caused
employment in manufacturing to fall from 78,700 in
1987 to 28,000 in 1993.
n In Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zaire, Sierra
Leone and Sudan, trade liberalisation in the 1980s
generated huge surges in consumer imports and
cutbacks in the foreign exchange available to
purchase capital and intermediate goods, with
severe consequences for industrial output and
employment. In Uganda for instance, industrial
capacity utilisation languished at 22% whilst
consumer imports absorbed 40-60% of foreign
exchange. A similar fall in industrial capacity usage
and unemployment in Nigeria led to policy
reversals in 1990, 1992 and 1994.
n Kenya’s beverage, textile, sugar, cement, tobacco,
leather and glass sectors have struggled to survive
competition from imports since a major trade
liberalisation programme was initiated in 1993.
Between 1993 and 1997, growth in industrial output
fell by 2.6% while growth in industrial employment
fell by 2.2%.
29  UNECA (2004) Africa Economic Report 2004, UNECA, New York; Winters, A. (2002) ‘Trade Policies of Poverty Alleviation’, in Hoekman, B. and Matoo, A. (2002) Trade, Development and the
WTO, World Bank, Washington D.C.
30  Amsden, A. (1989) Asia’s Next Giant, OUP, Oxford; Chang, H-J. (1993) 'The Political Economy of Industrial Policy in Korea', Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol.16, No.2.
31  Buffie, E. (2001) Trade Policy in Developing Countries, CUP, Cambridge.
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Table 1  Manufacturing output as a share of GDP and total employment, by region, 1960-2000
Region 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
GDP % Emp % GDP % Emp % GDP % Emp % GDP % Emp % GDP % Emp %
Sub-Saharan 15.3 4.4 17.8 4.8 17.4 6.2 14.9 5.9 14.9 5.5
Africa
West Asia & 10.9 7.9 12.2 10.7 10.1 12.9 15.6 15.1 14.2 15.3
North Africa
Latin America 28.1 15.4 26.8 16.3 28.2 16.5 25.0 16.8 17.8 14.2
South Asia 13.8 8.7 14.5 9.2 17.4 10.7 18.0 13.0 15.7 13.9
East Asia 14.6 8.0 20.6 10.4 25.4 15.8 26.8 16.6 27.0 14.9
(excl. China)
First-tier NICs 16.3 10.5 24.2 12.9 29.6 18.5 28.4 21.0 26.2 16.1
China 23.7 10.9 30.1 11.5 40.6 10.3 33.0 13.5 34.5 11.5
Developing 21.5 10.0 22.3 10.8 24.7 11.5 24.4 13.6 22.7 12.5
countries
Source: UNCTAD Trade and Development Report 2003
UNCTAD secretariat calculations, based on data on manufacturing output and GDP at current prices from World Bank, 1984 and 2003; Government Statistical System of
the Republic of China, online; International Labor Organization.
Note: Sub-Saharan Africa includes Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo,
Gabon, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Togo, Zambia and Zimbabwe; Latin America includes the
Southern Cone countries and Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay
and Peru; South Asia includes Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka; East Asia includes Hong Kong (China), Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines,the Republic of
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China and Thailand.
3. EPAs: the impact of reciprocity on development and
poverty reduction in Africa
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The impact of trade liberalisation under EPAs would be
deeper than that experienced under SAPs because
SAPs involved tariff reduction not elimination. For
instance, without some form of infant industry
protection, it is hard to see how African manufacturing,
in its nascent stage and already trailing the rest of the
world, will survive competition from European
corporations. Table 1 shows that manufacturing output
in sub-Saharan Africa has fallen as a share of GDP
since its peak in 1970.
Table 1 shows that even at its peak, manufacturing in
Africa was relatively low compared to the newly
industrialising countries (NICs). Manufacturing
employment as a share of total employment in sub-
Saharan Africa has fallen consistently since 1980. As is
demonstrated by the tomato canning and sugar
industries in Ghana and Kenya respectively, further
indiscriminate trade liberalisation in Africa at this stage
is likely to worsen the problem of de-industrialisation on
the continent, making poverty reduction efforts, such as
the pursuit of the millennium development goals, much
harder to achieve.
Evidence from Kenya and Ghana
Two factors combine to make agricultural trade
liberalisation a critical concern of African countries.
Firstly, agriculture is the mainstay of many African
economies, accounting for the bulk of national income,
providing livelihoods for 80-90% of the population, and
supplying about 20% of Africa’s merchandise exports.34
Secondly, the agricultural sector is the most distorted
market in world trade, partly as a result of the
protectionist policies of developed countries. Whilst
many African countries have been forced by SAPs to
reduce or eliminate many forms of support to their
producers, industrial countries continue to subsidise
theirs.35
Trade liberalisation under EPAs would pose two main
problems to African agriculture. Firstly, African producers
would find it hard to compete with European products
benefiting from EU subsidies and other forms of
support. More importantly, as Africa largely remains an
agrarian economy, agricultural trade liberalisation would
affect household welfare in more ways than one. As
EU integration: the wrong example
The European Commission holds that economic integration in general, and trade liberalisation in particular,
benefits all the countries involved. It claims that removing barriers to trade leads to increased competition,
lower prices, transfer of knowledge, increased efficiency, and ultimately, overall positive welfare gains and
economic development. This claim is based on the development experience of the EU itself.
There are two fundamental problems with this position: 
n European economic integration involved countries at similar levels of development. Africa contains some of
the poorest countries in the world and Europe some of the richest; the two parties to the deal are not equal.
n It took Europe nearly half a century to complete the elimination of all internal barriers to trade in goods.32 Yet
the EU is now demanding that African countries not only eliminate internal barriers amongst themselves, but
also all barriers to trade with the EU within 10-12 years.33
32  Szepesi, S. (2004) ‘Coercion or Engagement? Economics and Institutions in ACP-EU Trade Negotiations’, ECDPM Discussion Paper, 56 Maastricht, p.3.
33  European Commission (undated) Interpretation of Article XXIV, http://europa.eu.int/comm/external_relations/mercosur/bacground_doc/template_paper5.htm; also based on EU-South Africa
Trade, Development and Co-operation Agreement liberalisation timescale.
34  UNECA (2004).
35  UNECA (2004).
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households are both producers and consumers, welfare
gains on the consumption side could easily be offset
by losses in production if the household is a net
producer of non-tradables. Similarly, poor infrastructure
might leave African countries unable to realise new
market opportunities, even in commodities where the
continent has a competitive edge. There would
therefore be minimal gains for producers.
The economies of Kenya and Ghana illustrate the threat
that reciprocal trade liberalisation under EPAs would
pose to African countries. Like many African countries,
agriculture forms the backbone of these countries’
economies, accounting for 39% and 25% of Ghana’s
and Kenya’s GDP respectively.36 It supports the
livelihoods of millions of small-scale farmers, provides
employment to over 80% of the population and
supports the countries’ industrialisation efforts, including
the following sectors:









n educational and research institutes.
Furthermore, the agricultural sector houses most of the
commodities and products that are vital to these
countries’ economies because of their contribution to:
n national food security
n national employment
n fiscal revenues or GDP
n the development of national infrastructure 
n providing industrial linkages
n land and labour use.
36  ISSER (2004) The State of the Ghanaian Economy in 2003, ISSER, Legon; Republic of Kenya (2004) Economic Survey 2004, Government Printer, Nairobi.
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37  Doykos (1999); Carlsen, L. (2003) ‘The Mexican Farmers’ Movement: Exposing the Myths of Free Trade’, South Centre, Geneva.
38  Carlsen, L. (2003)
39  Carlsen, L. (2003)
40  CropChoice News, Thursday 10th July 2003.
41  CropChoice News.
42  Public Citizen Report (2001).
43  White, M. et al (2003) ‘NAFTA and the FTAA: A Gender Analysis of Employment and Poverty Impacts in Agriculture’, Women’s Edge Coalition.
44  Carlsen, L. (2003)
45  This accounts for the increased volume of trade between Mexico and the US. See: Carlsen, L. (2003).
46  Public Citizen Report (2001).
Mexico’s experience under NAFTA: the countryside can’t take it any more (El campo no aguanta más) 
Mexico’s experience under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) is a living example of the
negative developmental consequences of FTAs
between developed and developing countries:
Increased trade but greater poverty
Whilst the volume of trade between the US and
Mexico nearly doubled within the first decade of
NAFTA, the number of people living below the poverty
line in Mexico increased from 30% in 1994 to over
40% in 2003. Between 1994 and 2000, there was a
60% decline in real wages and a 50% decline in the
basic goods – food clothing, housing, health and
education – that Mexicans could afford to buy.37
Double standards
NAFTA isn’t really a ‘free trade area’ in practice, as the
US continues to subsidise its domestic industries,
especially corn. The liberalisation of the investment
sector has created major US monopolies in Mexico,
while the US uses flimsy health and safety measures
to impose trade barriers on Mexican products.38
Loss of food security
The country has increasingly become food insecure,
depending on imports for about 40% of its food
requirements.39 For instance, before NAFTA, Mexico
imported only 2.5 million tonnes of corn per year, as
the rest was produced locally: by 2001 they were
importing 6 million tonnes a year.40
Rural displacement
Corn imports have displaced thousands of Mexicans
living in rural areas who cultivated corn prior to NAFTA.
It is estimated that for every 10 tonnes of corn
exported to Mexico under NAFTA, an average of 2
rural Mexican dwellers migrate to the US.41 Up to 15
million Mexican small farmers could be displaced by
the end of the decade because of NAFTA's agriculture
provisions.42
Greater malnutrition
The liberalisation of the Mexican food industry has
also resulted in poorer health for Mexicans. The Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United
Nations found that 5 million Mexicans are
malnourished.43 By displacing local producers, NAFTA
has damaged local sources of quality food and its low
food tariffs have encouraged junk food imports from
the US.44
More unemployment
By the end of the 1990s, 1.7 million jobs had been
lost in agriculture, particularly in the corn and bean
sectors, which were flooded by subsidised US
imports: 28,000 small businesses have been forced
to close down.
Economic domination, US profiteering
Less than 50 US corporations dominate the Mexican
economy.45 The big NAFTA winners have been large
agribusinesses. Within the first decade of NAFTA, US
corporation Archer Daniels Midland's profits nearly
tripled from US$110 million to US$301 million and
ConAgra's profits grew from US$143 million to
US$413 million. In contrast, many Mexicans have
been forced into informal sector employment where
workers have no contract protections and are not
entitled to holiday or overtime pay.46
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ActionAid research conducted in Kenya and Ghana
suggests that reciprocity represents a major threat to
development and poverty reduction in Africa, propelled
not by legal or development imperatives, but mainly by
EU market access interests.* The research shows that
EPAs threaten sub-sectors and products that are critical
to Africa’s food security, employment and long-term
development. Much of this threat will come from
processed imported products from the EU. The
following case studies show that the agriculture,
industrial and service sectors in African economies are
so inter-twined and inter-dependent that the 10%
‘protective window’, proposed under EPAs is highly
unlikely to protect these countries’ long-term
development needs.
Tomatoes and the agro-processing industry 
in Ghana
The Upper East region is the poorest region of Ghana,
where tomatoes have been grown on a commercial
basis since the early 1960s. Several irrigation projects
have been set up, including the Tono project managed
by ICOUR (Irrigation Company of the Upper East
Region), a government parastatal established to
promote the production of food and cash crops by
small-scale farmers. The Tono Dam, built between 1975
and 1985, is one of the largest agricultural dams in
West Africa, covering a total catchment area of 3,600
hectares and providing a developed area of 2,400
hectares for growing irrigated crops. There are nine
villages living and farming within the project area and
each village has a population of 3-5,000 people. The
dam, which allows for year-round farming, has greatly
aided in the development of the region.
Tomatoes have long been the most lucrative crop in the
Upper East region (more profitable than rice, maize,
groundnuts, yam, pepper and dairy). Close to 90% of
the two million people living in the area cultivates them.
The country had moved into tomato processing as early
as 1968, with the establishment of three tomato
canneries producing tomato paste and puree, in
Pwalugu and Wenchi districts and at Nsawam near
Accra. These canneries operated on partial contract
farming arrangements, providing either equipment to
farmers or guaranteeing market access for pre-agreed
quantities produced by smallholders. Not all farmers
were engaged with the factories, but their presence
helped reduce the bargaining power of ‘Accra women’ –
fresh tomato traders who bought supplies from farmers
not contracted to the canneries, for sale throughout the
country.
The irrigation projects were conceived of as tools for
achieving national food security and improving rural
incomes. Towards this end, in the 1960s and 1970s, the
Ghanaian government intervened heavily in agriculture,
providing substantial subsidies, including machinery
and equipment, or in the case of the tomato industry,
three processing factories initiated by the state.
During the 1980s and 1990s, as part of policy
conditions from the IMF and the World Bank, the
Ghanaian government embarked on a major
Table 2  Tomato paste imported into
Ghana: 1990 - 2002
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* This includes not only the EU’s market access interests in Africa but also its market access interests globally. Concluding development-unfriendly FTAs with Africa would set a precedent for it
to follow in pursuing FTAs with other countries.
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privatisation, deregulation and liberalisation programme,
selling the tomato canning factories and relaxing trade
restrictions on tomato imports. This led to the collapse
of the Pwalugu and Nsawam tomato canning factories,
and enabled the heavily subsidised EU tomato industry
to penetrate the Ghanaian economy, as shown in 
table 2.
Increasing imports of EU tomato paste have impacted
negatively on the livelihoods of Ghanaian tomato
farmers, traders and industry employees, some of
whom have been displaced from their livelihoods,
retrenched or subjected to uncompetitive pricing
practices by middlemen who have now gained control
of the fresh tomato market in Ghana.
Samwel Abora: Ghanaian tomato farmer
Samwel Abora resigned from his job at the University
of Ghana at Legon, Accra in 1981 to concentrate on
tomato farming in Talisi District near the Pwalugu
tomato canning factory. He started growing tomatoes
on a part-time basis in 1978, and quickly realised that
the 5,000 Ghanaian cedis a year the university paid
him was far lower than the 30,000 cedis he was
getting as a tomato farmer. So he left the university 
to concentrate full time on tomato farming in 1981.
Samwel made a successful living, educating his four
daughters and three sons on the income derived from
tomato farming, even managing to buy a tractor. He
achieved national honours twice, winning the Best
Tomato Farmer award in the Upper East Region in
1994, and Best Overall Farmer, Upper East Region in
1999. 
However, competition from EU products means that
Samwel, like many of his fellow farmers at Pwalugu,
can no longer rely on tomato farming to make ends
meet. He has to plant a whole range of crops,
including maize, but this intercropping only provides
food for seven months of the year. 
Samwel, like many farmers in the Upper East Region,
now finds it difficult to pay school fees and to access
basic health services. Whilst liberalisation has
undermined their livelihoods, structural adjustment
policies have led to the introduction of school fees in
primary schools and ‘cost-sharing’ or user fees in




Why are EU tomato products cheaper than
Ghanaian ones?
The EU is the single biggest producer of fresh tomatoes
in the world with Italy, Spain, Greece, Portugal and 
France its leading producers.47 About 20% of EU
exports of tinned tomato paste and puree go to 
West Africa.48
EU policies guarantee European tomato producers a
minimum price and subsidise tomato processors and
exporters. Currently, processed tomato products in the
EU receive approximately E300 million per year in
direct subsidies and several million more indirectly (see
Table 3). This constitutes unfair competition to Ghanaian
tomato producers who receive no support from their
government. In fact, since the liberalisation and market
deregulation of the last decade, prices of agricultural
inputs in Ghana have continued to rise. In 2003, for
example, the price of a hoe, the most basic tool used
by Ghanaian farmers, rose by 30.8% whilst the prices 
of cutlasses and machetes rose by 15.1% and 14.3%
respectively. Price increases for fertilisers and chemicals
ranged from 2.5% to 32.2%.49
Further liberalisation of the tomato industry in Ghana, as
EPAs would probably require, would potentially result in
a flood of subsidised EU imports. That would in turn
threaten the livelihoods of 3 million Ghanaian farmers
and traders and hinder Ghanaian industrialisation
through agro-processing, as the collapse of the
Pwalugu and Nsawam canning factories demonstrate.
Although the Ghanaian tomato industry has internal
inefficiencies (poor roads, a lack of equipment, credit,
storage and refrigeration facilities), and the entry of EU
exporters into the Ghanaian market poses a serious
challenge, the tomato industry in Ghana remains viable
and worth protecting in the interest of the country’s
long-term development. Table 4 shows that, despite
increasing imports of EU tomato paste and the collapse
of Pwalugu and Nsawam factories, the production of
local fresh tomatoes remains substantial. Indeed, the
total land area used for tomato production grew by
about 30% from 28,400 hectares in 1996 to 37,000
hectares in 2000.51
47  WWF (undated) ‘Why work on agriculture?’ http://www.wwf.org.uk/researcher/issues/agriculture/index.asp
48  WWF (undated)
49  ISSER (2004) pp.119-120.
50  http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/budget/data/P2005_VOL4/EN/nmc-titleN123A5/nmc-chapterN12624/index.html#N12624
51  Government of Ghana (2002) ‘Ghana Investment Profile’.
Table 3  EU tomato subsidies
Export refunds on fruit
and vegetables
Compensation for withdrawals and
buying-in
Operational funds for producer
organisations
Production aid for processed tomato
products
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Why worry about the Ghanaian tomato industry?
Imported tomato paste from the EU presents a major
challenge to the Ghanaian tomato industry. The
Pwalugu, Wenchi and Nsawam tomato canning
factories were an integral part of the government’s early
efforts at industrialisation. The government invested
heavily in the tomato industry because it envisaged that
it would play a multi-functional role in the economy:
laying the groundwork for future industrialisation by
creating and supporting agro-based industries,
developing rural infrastructure, enhancing food security
and improving rural livelihoods. Despite its flaws, the
Ghanaian tomato industry has gone a long way in
trying to meet some of these objectives, and with some
reforms and a little protection from subsidised EU
products, it has the capacity to fulfil its intended
objectives. 
The cost of losing the industry to EU imports cannot
simply be viewed in relation to potentially cheaper
imported tomato paste, but must be considered as part
of Ghana’s dynamic, long-term development interests.
Moreover, estimates of annual fresh tomato production
in Ghana underestimate the losses incurred by
producers as a result of poor infrastructure and storage
facilities and marketing problems. These problems
underscore the utility of local tomato processing: since
the collapse of the two canning factories, it is estimated
that nearly half of all tomatoes produced in Ghana
annually go to waste due to storage, transport and
marketing problems.52
Sugar and the agro-chemicals and food industry
in Kenya
Sugar is a vital sub-sector of Kenya’s economy. Like the
tomato industry in Ghana, the sugar industry in Kenya
was to have a multi-functional role: it would encourage
rural industrialisation and infrastructure development
with a view to laying the groundwork for the country’s
agro-industrialisation, while providing rural employment
and bolstering national food security programmes.
Sugarcane farming remains the main lucrative
economic activity in Nyanza and Western provinces.
The sub-sector is a £200 million industry, indirectly
supporting 3 million people and providing direct and
indirect employment to 500,000 others,53 and is the
main source of livelihood for over 100,000 smallholder
farmers. The industry also generates about 10 billion
Kenya shillings (approximately £100 million) in
government revenues through taxes on farmers,
companies, consumers and import duties.54
The industry has helped to develop the regional
economies of Nyanza and Western provinces by
attracting other industries that rely on sugar by-products
as raw materials, such as agro-chemicals and food
processing, as well as confectionery and soft drinks
manufacturers.55 It has also stimulated the
development of rural infrastructure, including co-
generation of electricity from factories such as Mumias
Sugar Company, and provides quality primary
education, basic healthcare and social services – five
52  Yamson (2001) Interview with Mr. Yamson, Chief Executive Officer of Unilever Ghana, http://www.winne.com/ghana4/vp05.html
53  Republic of Kenya (2003) ‘Report of the Task Force on the Sugar Industry Crisis’.
54  Republic of Kenya (2003)




of the six sugar factories each have a first-class primary
school and health clinic serving local communities as
well as a ‘premiership’ football club. 
In spite of the contribution that the sugar industry has
made towards fulfilling the objectives of Kenya’s
national food policy, Kenya remains a net importer of
sugar, producing 400,000 tonnes of sugar per year
against an annual national consumption of 600,000
tonnes. Partly as a result of the distorted global sugar
market and partly as a result of internal inefficiencies,
imported sugar is much cheaper than locally produced
sugar. Most of this imported sugar comes from
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
(COMESA) countries. 
Kenya’s accession to the COMESA Free Trade
Agreement in 2000, which led to a reduction on import
duties on sugar from COMESA countries, nearly wiped
out the Kenyan sugar industry. This was partly
responsible for the collapse of two sugar factories
(Miwani and Muhoroni), and, with many factories failing
to pay farmers as a result of their inability to sell locally
produced sugar, throwing both the factories and the
farmers into long-term debt problems.56 The
government had to seek a temporary waiver from
COMESA to impose up to 120% duty on COMESA
sugar imports beyond the 200,000 tonne import quota. 
The Kenyan government acknowledges the inefficiency
of the national sugar industry, and has instituted
measures aimed at restoring efficiency to the sector.57
To do this, the government must be able to protect the
sector while it is being re-structured. If the policy space
needed to do this were to be eliminated under EPAs, an
industry that is vital to Kenya’s long-term development
interests would be severely threatened. 
The multi-functionality of the Kenyan sugar industry is
exemplified by its contribution to the national agro-
chemicals and food industries (see box).
The sugar industry has played a critical role in the
growth of the agro-chemicals and food industry in
Kenya, supplying spirit markets in Kenya and COMESA
and exporting the surplus to Europe, while most of the
yeast is sold regionally in East and Central Africa. The
viability of this industry and its vitality to Nyanza and
Western provinces is underscored by the recent
commissioning of the Kisumu Molasses Plant, another,
56  These problems were aggravated by Kenya’s own internal efficiency problems – factory mismanagement, corruption, political patronage and lack of enforcement of import quotas –  see for
instance, Republic of Kenya (2003).
57  Republic of Kenya (2003).
The Kenya Agro-Chemicals and Food Company  
The Kenya Agro-Chemical and Food Company
(KACFC), which relies on by-products of sugarcane
processing to produce a variety of food and industrial
products, exemplifies the role that sugar plays in the
Kenyan economy and underscores the critical inter-
relationship between agriculture and industry in
Kenya.
The company, located next to Muhoroni Sugar Factory
in Kisumu district, was incorporated in 1988 as a joint
venture between the Government of Kenya and the
private sector. The plant was initially set up to produce
power alcohol and bakers' yeast from cane molasses
(syrup) – a by-product of sugarcane processing.
KACFC has since expanded and diversified into other
related products, and currently uses 85,000 tonnes of
cane molasses a year (60% of Kenya's sugar industry
production) to produce a wide range of food,
pharmaceutical and industrial products, including
methylated spirits, alcohol, industrial solvents, yeast
and ethanol.
3. EPAs: the impact of reciprocity on development and
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potentially much bigger, company relying on sugar by-
products to produce agro-chemical and food products. 
While it is true that the Kenyan sugar industry has long
faced internal inefficiencies, due to corruption and
political patronage amongst other factors, it remains
central to Kenya’s long-term development. It is therefore
essential that these problems be addressed internally to
ensure the survival of the sector and to protect the
industry from subsidised EU imports. 
Eliminating protection against imported sugar might
mean cheaper (imported) sugar for Kenyans (although
this depends on traders passing on the lower prices to
consumers). But this potential benefit must be seen in
the context of the massive impact the end of protection
would have on livelihoods and jobs, which goes
beyond  sugar farmers and their families. Given the
structure of African economies, tariff reductions do not
merely result in loss of government revenues or jobs.
An industry like sugar in Kenya for example, does not
just serve its 100,000 smallholder producers: it
indirectly supports 3 million people, accounts for 28%
of government excise revenues, provides employment
for half a million people, supports several other
industries, as well as rural infrastructure, hospitals and
schools. This makes the distinction between ‘producers’
and ‘consumers’ less useful, as producers are not only
also consumers, but are also the source of consumer
purchasing power.
Thus, whilst imported sugar might be cheap in the short
term, it is incapable of fulfilling the multi-functional roles
that locally produced sugar plays, such as providing
industrial linkages and supporting rural employment.
The benefits of locally produced sugar must not be
determined from the narrow lens of consumer welfare
but rather be considered from the much broader
perspective of long-term national development.
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Because they depend heavily on trade taxes for fiscal
revenue, the fiscal stability of many African countries is
threatened by trade liberalisation. The United Nations
Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) estimates
that international trade taxes generated on average
30.5% of total revenues for sub-Saharan African
countries over the last decade. This compares with
0.8% for high-income OECD countries, 18.42% for
lower-medium income countries and 22.5% for all low-
income countries.58 Moreover, whilst the share of trade
taxes as percentage of total current revenues is
declining in the rest of the world, in Africa it has either
stayed flat or increased slightly.59
The loss of revenue from the elimination of import
duties could therefore lead to severe cutbacks in
African public expenditures at a time that the continent
is struggling to combat HIV/AIDS, illiteracy and food
insecurity, amongst other problems. This would be
inconsistent with the current global consensus that
increased public spending in poor countries is
necessary to meet development objectives,60 a fact
recognised by the Secretary-General of the United
Nations, Kofi Annan:
A major concern, for example, is the impact that the
trade liberalization to be wrought by EPAs would
have on fiscal revenue. Many of your countries are
heavily dependent on income from tariffs for
government revenue. The prospect of falling
government revenue, combined with falling
commodity prices and huge external indebtedness,
imposes a heavy burden on your countries and
threatens to further hinder your ability to achieve the
Millennium Development Goals.61
EU countries, on the other hand, will not face this
problem of revenue losses, partly because many
traditional African exports already enter the EU market
duty-free and partly because the economies of the EU
are diversified and have huge taxable income bases. 
The European Commission argues that revenue losses
from tariff elimination constitute ‘short-term adjustment
costs’ which would be overcome quickly through, for
instance, re-structuring African tax systems, which have
long been viewed as inefficient. 
This argument is fundamentally flawed. Admittedly,
shifting taxation away from tariffs has proved extremely
difficult for many African governments: tariffs accounted
for 31% of total tax revenue in Africa in 1975, yet by
1995 had declined by only 4% to 27%.62 While some
African countries have inefficient tax systems, many
have undergone significant restructuring since 1995,
through a range of tax measures aimed at expanding
the tax base and making them more efficient. These
include the introduction of the value-added tax (VAT),
taxes directed at farmers and other low-income groups,
as well as local state or council taxes. Charts 1 and 2
show the diversification and complexity of tax systems
in Senegal and Kenya. 
58  UNECA (2004) p.192.
59  UNECA (2004) p.192.
60  See for example: Brown, G. (2004) Speech by Gordon Brown on ‘Making globalisation work for all – the challenge of delivering the Monterrey consensus’ 16th February 2004 in which he
said: “It is precisely because we know that education is the very best anti-poverty strategy, the best economic development programme, that the UK will, over ten years, spend £1 billion on
educational aid — alongside the World Bank’s excellent education Fast Track Initiative.  Yet while all the public spending on sub-Saharan African education taken together is, per pupil, is still
less than $40 a year, less than one dollar per week, it is estimated that, overall, education needs, annually, $10 billion - predictable regular financing that no one aid budget, and no one
nation, can achieve on its own.” http://www.hmtreasury.gov.uk/newsroom_and_speeches/press/2004/press_12_04.cfm
61  Annan, K. (2004) UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s message to the Fourth Summit of Heads of State and Government of the African, Caribbean, Pacific Group, delivered by K.Y. Amoako,
Executive Secretary, Economic Commission for Africa, in Maputo, 23rd June, http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2004/sgsm9386.doc.htm
62  Keen, M. and Ligthart, J.E. (1999) ‘Coordinating Tariff Reduction and Domestic Tax Reform’, IMF, p.3.
4. EPAs: the impact on African
government revenues and
public services
fighting poverty together 21
Trade traps  Why EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements pose a threat to Africa’s development
Chart 1   Senegal: (taxes as a percentage of government revenue)
Chart 2   Composition of Kenyan government revenue by source 2002-2003 
(KEPLOTRADE Background Study No 8)
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The charts confirm that many African countries have
diversified their tax systems away from over-reliance on
import duties within the last decade. In Senegal, for
instance, the government has increased indirect taxes
such as VAT as the proportional contribution of import
taxes to government revenues has declined. 
Table 5 shows the pervasive nature of VAT in African
countries.
Whilst VAT is generally regarded as being non-
distortionary and for that reason better than tariffs, it can
negatively impact on the poor. The UN Economic
Commission for Africa notes: 
Taxing consumption may be more regressive than
taxing income, and this is a particular concern in
poor countries, especially as in many of their
economies commodity taxes have traditionally
accounted for a higher proportion of government
revenues than income taxes.63
The European Commission’s argument that revenue
losses under EPAs can easily be remedied through tax
adjustment is therefore hollow. Because many African
countries have already liberalised through structural
adjustment, they will face reductions in revenues as a
result of further liberalisation.64
It is difficult to see how increases in other forms of
taxation can be made in ways that are both fair and
effective. A growing body of evidence suggests that
new and often intractable problems have arisen where
other forms of taxation have been tried. This casts grave
doubts on the viability of further tax reforms, even
where they are feasible. For instance, in Uganda and
Tanzania, local taxes have been severely criticised for
serious revenue leakages in the private tax collection
system and for the adverse impacts that the regressive
nature of these taxes have on income distribution.65 In
Tanzania, poor public services and perceived corruption
amongst officials have led to significant resistance to
local taxes. Furthermore, many local government staff in
these countries lack the capacity to administer new
complex forms of revenue collection.66
ActionAid research in Ghana and Kenya found that, in
addition to increasing indirect taxes, the governments of
the two countries have also resorted to directly taxing
agricultural producers. In Ghana, this takes the form of
an export tax on cocoa (long taxed) and timber
products whilst in Kenya a ‘presumptive income tax’ is
levied on farmers producing crops such as sugarcane.
These taxes depress farmer incomes and can
discourage commodity production, as has periodically
been the case with export taxes on Ghanaian cocoa.
63  UNECA (2004) p.203.
64  UNECA (2004) p.197.
65  Bahiigwa, G. et al (2004) ‘Uganda Rural Taxation Study: final report’, p.iii.
66  Fieldstad, O-H. (2001) ‘Fiscal decentralisation in Tanzania: for better or worse?’ WP 2001:10, Chr. Michelson Institute.








1995 Gabon, Mauritania, Togo, Zambia
1996 Guinea, Uganda
1997 Republic of Congo
1998 Ghana, Mauritius, Tanzania
1999 Cameroon, Mozambique
2000 Chad, Namibia, Sudan
Source: IMF, Various
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The European Commission’s proposals for EPAs also
seek to include agreements on investment, government
procurement and competition policy, issues often
known within the WTO as the ‘Singapore issues’.
Developing countries, and specifically ACP
governments, decisively rejected the idea of opening
up discussions on these issues at the 2003 WTO
Cancún Ministerial.
One of the Singapore issues is investment. The
European Commission argues that increased flows of
foreign direct investment (FDI) are central to poverty
alleviation and essential if African countries are to take
advantage of greater access to the European market.
ActionAid agrees that FDI could aid Africa’s
development if managed responsibly, but we disagree
with the European Commission’s policy of greater
deregulation of African investment regimes and
indiscriminately opening up African markets to
European corporations. This would remove the 
policy tools that governments might use to ensure that
investment is socially responsible, economically
productive and consistent with national development
goals. 
In seeking an agreement on investment, government
procurement and competition policy under EPAs after
developing countries collectively rejected such
agreements at the WTO, the European Commission is
pursuing a self-interested market access agenda
without due consideration to the development needs of
African countries.67 Agreements on these issues would
create lopsided rules that would disproportionately
benefit EU investors at the expense of domestic African
investors, leading to the economic exploitation of
African producers, workers, small-scale and medium-
level processors. It would also curtail the policy choices
available to African governments in pursuit of their
development objectives.
Investment agreements do not increase
investment flows
The European Commission argues that an investment
agreement would attract much-needed FDI into these
countries. However, extensive literature suggests that
FDI does not necessarily precede economic growth or
follow the conclusion of investment protection treaties
or free market policies.68
Despite the high number of bilateral investment treaties
(BITs) concluded by African countries (see below) and
the extensive rights given to foreign investors, Africa
continues to lag behind the rest of the world in
attracting FDI. The 1990s saw a massive explosion in
both global FDI and flows to developing countries: FDI
in the world grew by an average of 26% per year, while
the flows to developing countries grew by 21%. Yet
flows to Africa only grew by 14% per year (mostly
concentrated in South Africa and North Africa). Africa’s
share of total world FDI and total developing country
FDI dropped by 1% and 3% respectively.69 A recent
World Bank survey on FDI flows from industrial
countries to 31 developing countries explains this
contradiction by stating that, 
Countries that had concluded a BIT were no more
likely to receive additional FDI than were countries
without such a pact.70
Interestingly, countries such as China and Malaysia,
with comparatively illiberal investment regimes have
been amongst the largest recipients of FDI during the
last decade. This suggests that the level of a country’s
per capita income, its rate of growth and its physical
and human capital infrastructure are more critical
determinants of FDI than free markets or legal and
regulatory frameworks.71
There is therefore no compelling reason why investment
agreements under EPAs will lead to increased FDI flows
to Africa. On the contrary, such agreements, including
67  Investment, government procurement and competition policy were withdrawn from the Doha Development Agenda and put into working groups.
68  African Development Bank (2001) ‘International Investment in Africa: Trends and Opportunities’; Chang, H-J. (2003); Chang, H-J. (2002); Singh, A. (2001) ‘Foreign Direct Investment and
International Agreements: A South Perspective’, South Centre, Geneva; UNCTAD (2000) A Positive Agenda for Developing Countries: Issues for Future Trade Negotiations, UNCTAD, Geneva;
World Bank (2003) Global Economic Prospects and the Developing Countries 2003: Investing to Unlock Global Opportunities, World Bank, Washington D.C.
69  African Development Bank (2001).
70  World Bank (2003).
71  Bhinda, N. et al (1999) Private Capital Flows to Africa: Perception and Reality, FONDAD, The Hague.
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increased rights for European corporations to repatriate
profits abroad, could increase capital flight from the
continent. Africa already has a higher proportion of
wealth held overseas by residents than any other region
of the world: 39% as opposed to east Asia’s 6% before
the financial crisis of 1997.72 Capital flight amounts to a
significant economic loss for Africa, constituting a
diversion of domestic savings from investment and a
loss of fiscal revenue (through loss of taxation). It also
sustains the adverse psychological perception that
Africa is not conducive to FDI.
Investor-friendly regimes are already in place
Since the mid 1980s, nearly all African countries have
taken steps to reform and liberalise their investment
regimes through a combination of policy, legal and
institutional changes. Consequently, the continent has
one of the most investor-friendly investment regimes in
the world. There are currently 35 investment promotion
agencies (IPAs) in Africa, and African countries have
concluded 428 bilateral investment treaties (BITs),
mostly with European countries73 : this constitutes
about a quarter of all BITs in the world. 
At least 42 African countries have joined both the
Convention for the Settlement of Investment Disputes
between States and Other States (administered by the
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment
Disputes – ICSID) and the Multilateral Investment
Guarantee Agency (MIGA), administered by the World
Bank, which offer non-commercial risk coverage for
foreign investment. 
These investment agencies and treaties already fulfil
the EU’s stated aims of new investment agreements,
which are: 
n legal stability and the prohibition of nationalisation
and expropriation without compensation
n simplification of investment procedures and the
provision of incentives and good conditions to
foreign investors
n guaranteed repatriation of profits and dividends and
creating a conducive environment for FDI.
These agencies and treaties are not just limited to
protecting and promoting FDI – they perform a wide
range of functions. BITs, for instance, reflect the
asymmetrical power relationship between African and
European countries. Many European countries have
used them to obtain investment concessions from
African countries that they would not obtain at the WTO. 
Nearly all the BITs in Africa provide for all the principles
that were rejected at the WTO in 2003 as part of the
‘Singapore issues’ package, giving foreign corporations
equal treatment to local industries (usually small and
medium scale). This is known as the principle of ‘non-
discrimination’ or national treatment. Many BITs in Africa
go beyond this principle to discriminate against
domestic investors: in order to attract FDI, foreign
investors in nearly all the BITs in Africa are given greater
rights than domestic investors.
Investors are protected by competition for FDI
Evidence suggests that protection of foreign investors is
guaranteed by the intense competition for FDI between
developing countries, ensuring that no developing
country is keen to develop a poor reputation with
foreign investors.74 Under these circumstances, it is
difficult not to see the EU’s push for investment
agreements as part of an aggressive strategy to 
further open African markets for its corporations. 
Corporate abuse
Foreign investors have exploited these rights to
constrain the rights of African states to pursue
legitimate economic, social and environmental priorities.
Since the 1990s, foreign investors have used some of
these treaties to file suits barring African states from
pursuing economic policies that would undermine their
profits, or seeking compensation for losses associated
with socially or environmentally prioritised objectives.
72  UNECA (1999) ‘The joint conference of African Ministers of Finance and Economic Planning and Development’, UNECA, 9th May 1999, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
73  African Development Bank (2001).
74  Singh, A. (2001).
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Twenty-one such cases have been brought against
African states, the majority of which involve
multinational companies claiming monopoly rights over
mining and extractive industries, particularly in mineral-
rich but war-torn countries such as the Democratic
Republic of Congo (DRC).75
Do as I say, not as I did…
Economic history demonstrates that non-discrimination
or national treatment – the idea that a country cannot or
should not systematically discriminate between
domestic and foreign investors – is not a successful
development strategy. During the early stages of their
development, many of the now developed countries did
not adhere to this principle. They used a range of
instruments, including limits on foreign ownership,
insistence on joint ventures between foreign and local
firms, local employment and performance requirements
to build up their national industries.76 Even today,
employment policies in nearly all the developed
countries discriminate against developing country
labour.
The infant industry argument best illustrates the case
for national discrimination. Infant industry protection
(more broadly defined than by the simple deployment
of tariffs77), is necessary, if not sufficient, for
developmental success. Every now-developed country
adopted such a strategy; every successful developing
country since 1945 followed such a path.78 By denying
African countries this same right, developed countries
are hampering their industrial development.
By limiting the policy space available to governments in
their pursuit of social or economic objectives,
investment agreements would also disenfranchise the
African people, by limiting their ability to determine their
own social or economic priorities. Local policy
ownership would be further sidelined in favour of
greater rights for corporations.
The NAFTA investment agreement: a threat to society and the environment79
The investment agreement under NAFTA is so broadly
defined that it gives foreign investors the right to seek
compensation from any government action that
reduces an investor’s property value or expected
profits. Within the first decade of NAFTA, multinational
corporations had used these provisions to attack a
wide range of environmental, social and economic
measures in Mexico, Canada and the US, claiming a
whopping US$13 billion compensation in their initial
filings. Some examples are listed here:
n In 1997, Metaclad, a US firm filed a US$90 million
claim against a Mexican municipality’s refusal to
grant it construction permit for a toxic waste dump.
The NAFTA investors’ tribunal awarded Metaclad
US$15.6 million despite the fact that the
municipality was observing a state declaration of
an ecological zone within its jurisdiction.
n In 1998, the US Ethyl Corporation won US$13
million in compensation and forced Canada to lift
its ban on MMT, a gasoline additive that can
damage the nervous system.
n In 2000, the NAFTA investors’ tribunal forced
Canada to pay US$50 million to another US toxic
waste disposal company, SD Myers. Canada,
acting in accordance with the Basel convention on
the control of transboundary movement of
hazardous waste, had denied it the right to export
hazardous polychlorinated biphenyl waste from
Canada for incineration in the US.
75  ICSID (2003): www.icsid.org
76  Chang, H-J. (2002); Ranis, G. (2003) ‘Symposium on Infant Industries: A Comment’, Oxford Development Studies; Tribe, M. (2003) ‘Manufacturing, Development and De-industrialisation:
Rethinking the Infant Industry Concept’, The Courier, ACP-EU.
77 To include selective credit, overvalued exchange rates, preferential access to rationed inputs, favoured access to research and development etc.
78 See Chang, H-J. (2002); Ranis, G. (2003); Tribe, M. (2003).
79  Alejandro, V. (undated) RMALC Mexico, presentation to the European Parliament: ‘Learning Lessons from NAFTA: Dangers of an Investment Agreement at the WTO’.
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The colonial fragmentation of Africa into many nation
states with little economic coherence has made
regional integration a central plank of African
development strategy since political independence. The
small size and the primary production structure of the
typical African economy has provided the rationale for
pursuing mutually beneficial economic objectives
through regional integration amongst adjacent states. At
the same time the pan-African political aspiration for
continental identity, unity and emancipation from the
economic and political vestiges of Africa’s colonial past
provides the political underpinnings of economic and
political integration in Africa. 
Regional integration efforts
In order to realise these objectives, African countries
have established a number of continental and regional
economic and political bodies since the 1960s,
including the African Union (AU); the East African
Community (EAC); the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS); the Southern African
Development Community (SADC); the Central African
Economic and Monetary Community (CEMAC); the
West African Economic Monetary Union (WAEMU); and
the African Development Bank (ADB). 
African regional integration has been pursued as a
strategy for the structural transformation of African
economies. It is intended to promote the self-reliant
development of African states by expanding markets,
creating economies of scale and diversifying African
economies. 
African efforts to achieve these goals through regional
integration between 1960 and 1990 have been
hampered by endemic political instability, low levels of
structural complementarity among many African
economies,80 inadequate mechanisms for equitably
sharing the costs and benefits of regional integration,81
flawed economic policies, overlapping membership and
external interference by the superpowers during the
cold war. Nevertheless, despite these problems, African
regional integration made great strides in:
n monetary integration, e.g. WAEMU 
n regional infrastructure and political action, e.g.
SADCC (predecessor to SADC), in containing and
mitigating the economic effects of apartheid South
Africa
n dealing with political turmoil, e.g. ECOWAS in Liberia
and Sierra Leone 
n non-tariff integration, e.g. PTA (predecessor to
COMESA), which created common forms and
common trade rules.
Since the 1990s, African governments have renewed
regional integration efforts. The new efforts are taking
place in a different environment from that of the past –
a new generation of African leaders, a post-cold war
world, and a shift in economic policy from inward-
looking to more outward-oriented strategies. Achieving
political and economic objectives will still be difficult,
but the prospects look much better than they did in 
the past. 
EPAs threaten to kill off these prospects. The European
Commission claims that EPAs will promote African
regional integration by increasing intra-regional African
trade, trade between Africa and the EU, and trade
between Africa and the rest of the world. However,
evidence suggests the opposite. Due to a combination
of economic, political and historical factors, regional
integration in Africa is a vastly complex exercise that
cannot be achieved simply by trade liberalisation. 
80  De Melo, J. and Panagariya, A. (1992) ‘New Dimensions in Regional Integration’, Centre for Economic Policy Research.
81  This in particular has long plagued the East African Community (EAC) one of the earliest and relatively advanced African efforts at regional integration. It partly contributed to the collapse of
the initial experiment in 1977 and continues to strain the newly revived EAC. It recently torpedoed efforts to establish an East African Customs Union by September 2004 and this has now
been postponed to 2005 when the three countries propose to approach the World Bank for funds to offset revenue losses that would accrue as a result of the Union.
6. EPAs: the impact on African
regional integration
fighting poverty together 27
Trade traps  Why EU-ACP Economic Partnership Agreements pose a threat to Africa’s development
Why EPAs would not foster African regional
integration
Over the last decade, the African Development Bank
has conducted a series of studies on regional
integration in Africa.82 These studies make two critical
observations that undermine any notion that EPAs are
compatible with African regional integration:
The first is that the complexities of African regional
integration underscore the need for the following: 
n flexibility in the evolution of integration organisations
n pragmatism in the speed of integration 
n political will on the part of participating countries to
ensure the implementation of agreed measures. 
Because African countries differ in size, levels of
economic development, and the need and extent of
reforms needed, the process of regional integration
must be sufficiently flexible to allow it to proceed at
different speeds for different sub-groups of countries.
This is known as a ‘multi-speed variable geometry
approach’. For instance, although COMESA is a Free
Trade Agreement, bringing together 21 African
countries, to date, only 9 of these countries have
reduced their tariffs to zero; 6 have reduced tariffs in the
range of 20-90% and 5 have not made any reductions
at all.  It is this ‘multiple speed, variable geometry
approach’ that has enabled the region to keep moving
towards greater regional integration. 
Although it has taken existing African regional bodies
more than 20 years to reach their current levels of
coherence, EPAs require African countries to group
themselves into regional free trade areas between now
and 2007 and eliminate 90% of the tariffs between
them and the EU within a 10-12 year period. This
ignores the fact that the coherence, indeed the very
survival, of many African regional trade agreements has
depended on the kind of flexibility displayed by
COMESA. Moreover, regional integration through
groupings specifically formed for the purpose of
concluding EPAs with the EU constitutes a process that
is EU-driven rather than mobilised through grassroots
African support or with the political will and
commitment of African political leaders. Such groupings
would suffer from a lack of internal or political cohesion.
The second observation is that, given the low levels of
complementarity between African economies, regional
integration should adopt a production-focussed
approach which addresses supply-side constraints
such as infrastructure and other regional public goods
(for example: roads, dams, research and development).
This approach will generate growth and create the
scope for increased trade rather than a trade-focussed
strategy favoured by EPAs, which does not align trade
liberalisation with the development strategies or
interests of individual countries. The trade-focussed
approach reduces regional integration to trade
liberalisation.
EPAs also threaten to break up existing African regional
groupings. In order to negotiate EPAs, some countries
have been forced to join new groupings of countries
outside the regional bodies they already belong to,
causing a lot of strain and raising questions about the
viability of long established economic and political
blocs such as COMESA, ECOWAS, EAC and SADC.
Part of the problem is that some African countries are
members of more than one regional grouping, yet the
EU insists that:
An individual state can only be a member of a single
trading arrangement with the EU [and] it is imperative
that the problems raised by overlapping
membership must be resolved by those
concerned.83
82  African Development Bank (1989) ‘Economic Integration and Development in Africa’; African Development Bank (1993) ‘Economic Integration and Structural Adjustment’; African
Development Bank (1993) ‘Economic Integration in Southern Africa’.





Besides its incompatibility with African regional
integration, EPAs will not enhance African access to the
European market. This is because:
n Many African countries already enjoy good access to
the EU market on quota and duty-free terms,
particularly in traditional commodity exports. The
Everything But Arms (EBA) agreement offers Least
Developed Countries duty access on virtually all
imports.84
n The EU will maintain protectionist policies such as
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and stringent
health and safety regulations. In spite of the
framework agreement in at the WTO in July 2004,
domestic support for agriculture will remain in place
for a long time. As the Mexicans realised through
NAFTA, a ‘free trade area’ between a developed
country and a developing country is not really ‘free’.
Developed countries can still use their power to
impose all forms of non-trade barriers to products
from their poor FTA partners. 
n Many African countries are not natural trading
partners because they largely produce, export and
import similar products, so the scope for intra-African
regional trade is limited.85
n EPAs would not lead to increased trade between
Africa and the rest of the world unless the significant
supply-side constraints currently plaguing African
countries, such as poor and dilapidated
infrastructure, are urgently addressed.
The factors above combine to create a hub-and-spoke
regional integration rather than a partnership. Europe is
the hub, and each African EPA group serves as a
spoke, providing a limited number of raw commodities
of diminishing economic value. In this situation, intra-
African trade is of decreasing importance. As one
Ghanaian tomato scholar put it: 
EPAs may be the EU’s idea of a partnership, but they
will be our pathway to poverty.
84  Stevens, C. and Kennan, J. (2004) p.17.
85  De la Rocha, M. (2003) ‘The Cotonou Agreement and Its Implications for the Regional Trade Agenda in Eastern and Southern Africa’, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3090;
Szepesi, S. (2004) ‘Coercion or Engagement? Economics and Institutions in ACP-EU Trade Negotiations’, ECDPM Discussion Paper, 56 Maastricht; Wood, A. and Mayer, J. (2001) ‘Africa’s
Export Structure in a Comparative Perspective’, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol.25 No.3.
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The process by which EPAs are being negotiated is
deeply flawed. Many ACP countries have weak trade
negotiating capacities and are heavily dependent on EU
aid. The European Commission has taken advantage of
its political and economic power to dictate the pace
and terms of EPA negotiations to ACP countries.
Pace of the EPA negotiations
EPA negotiations were supposed to be conducted in
two phases. The first phase began in September 2002
between the EU and all ACP countries, negotiating as a
bloc. This provided a more balanced negotiating
scenario, but the European Commission hastily pushed
for an inconclusive end to this phase of the
negotiations, and then hurriedly forced the second
phase, which involved dividing the ACP bloc into much
smaller sub-regions whilst the EU remained as a single
negotiating bloc.86
The first phase of the negotiations was very important
to ACP countries because they wanted to avoid a
situation whereby the EU would use divide-and-rule
tactics by seeking agreements with the weakest
groupings first and then using these as the template for
similar agreements with more advanced regions. In
particular, the ACP countries had wanted to use the first
phase of talks to obtain a legally-binding framework
with the EU on the scope and structure that would
guide phase two of the EPA negotiations at the regional
level. Such a framework would have resolved the
question of reciprocity once and for all and avoided the
current situation whereby the EU sets the terms and
pace of the negotiations and uses divide-and-rule
tactics to obtain maximum concessions from ACP
countries. The EU objected to such a framework, and
significant divergences between EU and ACP positions
from that phase remain unresolved.
European meddling
The European Commission continues to insist that the
EPA process is one of meaningful ‘negotiations’ rather
than European impositions. Yet this is rather difficult to
sustain when the EPA process is examined in detail.
For example, the European Commission directly funds
many of the trade negotiators on the African side. EU
officials sometimes attend intra-African regional
meetings and even national negotiating preparatory
meetings. This level of intervention by the European
Commission makes it difficult to see the EPA process
as a genuine negotiation.
Lack of an independent dispute settlement
mechanism
Any trade agreement needs a neutral and respected
dispute settlement mechanism. These exist in the WTO
and in NAFTA, for example. However, EPAs make no
provision for such a mechanism. As a result, the EU will
most likely act as ‘judge’ in any disputes, because of its
role as an ‘aid donor’ and its sheer economic and
political might. The history of dispute settlement at the
WTO and NAFTA underscore the utility of such a
mechanism within trade agreements: the fact that one
does not exist for EPAs is in itself a sufficient reason for
ACP countries to reject them.
African voices
The EU continues to ignore the concerns of ACP
countries as expressed by political leaders, trade
negotiators and civil society organisations. For instance,
in an address to the joint ACP-EU ministers’ meeting in
Gaborene on 6th May 2004, the President of Botswana
expressed grave doubts concerning reciprocity by
defending the non-reciprocal trade preferences under
Lomé. He described them as, 
equal to none, in their capacity to create
opportunities for the integration of the economies
of ACP countries into the world economy. 
86  For this and other ‘process issues’ relating to EPAs negotiations see, for instance: www.epawatch.net
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He then issued the following warning about EPAs: 
You will understand, therefore, if we are
apprehensive about the proposed Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which are currently
being negotiated. This is in spite of repeated EU
assurances that the Economic Partnership
Agreements would not disadvantage any ACP
country. We fear that our economies will not be
able to withstand the pressures associated with
liberalization. This therefore challenges us all as
partners to ensure that the outcome of the ongoing
EPA negotiations does not leave ACP countries
more vulnerable to the vagaries of globalisation and
liberalisation, thus further marginalising their
economies.87
Mauritius has expressed similar concerns. In a written
submission to the EU and ACP member states on 17th
May 2002 it warned against using WTO rules as a
guise for imposing a failed model of economic
development on ACP countries.  
The clear and unequivocal position of the ACP
Group is that the current WTO rules are inherently
imbalanced against the development needs of the
Group. In line with the results of the Doha WTO
Ministerial Conference, the ACP Group will
therefore refrain from making commitment(s) on
this front until the WTO rules for trade arrangements
between developed and developing countries
become clear, and also on special and differential
treatment.88
Botswana and Mauritius are two of Africa’s most
successful economies. They can speak relatively freely
because they are less dependent on EU aid. Their
concerns are shared by a great many number of African
countries that will not speak as freely because of their
dependence on EU aid. More importantly, these two
countries understand the importance of international
trade in economic development, having been the
greatest beneficiaries of the non-reciprocal Lomé
preferences.
87  Mogae, F. (2004) ‘Speech by President of Botswana, Festus Mogae in an address to the Joint ACP-EU Ministers Meeting in Gaborene on 6th May 2004’.
88  Government of Mauritius (2002).
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The Cotonou Partnership Agreement provides for
examination of
All alternative possibilities, in order to provide these
countries with a new framework of trade, which is
equivalent to their existing situation and in
conformity with WTO rules.89
A forthcoming ActionAid report examines in detail
possible alternatives to EPAs. These might include: 
n extending the Everything But Arms initiative to all
ACP countries
n revising the Enabling Clause, Article XXIV and related
articles of the WTO to allow for development-friendly
trade agreements between developed and
developing countries
n basing reciprocity on the attainment of objective
socio-economic indicators rather than on arbitrary
timeframes and percentage of traded goods.
89  Article 37.6, Cotonou Partnership Agreement (2000).
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Reciprocal trade liberalisation between rich developed
countries and poor developing countries is a major
threat to poverty reduction and development.
Developing country governments must be allowed to
protect and promote infant industries in order to
develop their economies and eradicate poverty.
Reciprocal trade liberalisation is at the heart of
proposed economic partnership agreements between
the European Union and African countries. ActionAid
research in Ghana and Kenya shows that free trade
EPAs would inflict substantial damage on emerging
African industrial sectors and close off the policy space
governments need to ensure long-term national
development.
EPAs threaten African fiscal stability and public
spending. They introduce investment agreements and
other ‘Singapore issues’ that would undermine African
policy choices. EPAs threaten African regional
integration and lack an independent dispute settlement
mechanism.
The EPA negotiating process will continue to lack a
credible development focus so long as the European
Commission seeks to marginalise African concerns and
foment division amongst the ACP group. 
ActionAid therefore calls upon UK and European
policy makers to make changes in the following
areas:
European Commission’s EPA negotiating
mandate
European Union member states must revise the
European Commission’s EPA negotiating mandate to
withdraw:
n the demand for reciprocal trade liberalisation
n negotiations on investment, competition policy and
public procurement. 
The British Government must use its presidency of
the EU in 2005 to ensure a comprehensive review of
the European Commission’s EPA negotiating mandate
so as to withdraw the demands for reciprocal trade
liberalisation and negotiations on investment,
competition policy and government procurement.
WTO rules
The European Union must use its influence at the
WTO to push for the revision of Article XXIV and other
clauses governing regional trade agreements between
developed and developing countries. Provision should
be made for more pro-poor and pro-development free
trade areas between developed and developing
countries. This should form an integral part of a
concluded Doha development round.
Parliamentary oversight
UK: the House of Commons’ International Development
and Trade and Industry select committees to open
inquiries into the state of EPA negotiations.
The European Parliament must launch an investigation
into the European Commission’s approach to the EPA
negotiations and to exercise effective oversight over the
Commission’s negotiating mandate, tactics and
processes.
Alternatives to EPAs
The European Union must begin to immediately
examine all possible alternatives to EPAs.
9. Conclusions and recommendations
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